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Competition in Health Services:
Overview, Issues and Answers*
Clark C. Havighurst**
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition must now be taken seriously as a strategy for re-
introducing cost-consciousness into the health care system and for
guiding the system's growth and development in the 1980s.
Throughout most of the 1970s, the prevalent assumption was that
regulation would necessarily be the dominant mechanism of social
control. In 1979, however, the Ninety-Sixth Congress definitively
reopened the debate over whether competition or regulation can
better serve the public. Among other signs of renewed congres-
sional interest in this question, the Health Planning and Resources
Development Amendments of 1979 put Congress expressly on re-
cord as favoring competition "wherever competition and consumer
choice can constructively serve ...to advance the purposes of
quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and access." 1 While this
stated preference for competition intentionally begs the ultimate
question of its efficacy in particular circumstances, it indicates that
competition is now to be given some chance to show what it can
do. The amendments are just one sign of an emerging national pol-
icy to rely, wherever it is responsible to do so, on the demand side
of the market for health services, rather than on regulation, to dis-
cipline the market's supply side.
This Article is intended to put in context the many issues
raised by this new interest in competition as a disciplinary force in
the health services industry. After presenting a statement of the
* Research for this Article was supported by Grant No. HS01539 from the National
Center for Health Services Research, Department of Health and Human Services. This
Article is based on a paper entitled "Competition in Health Services-An Equal Number of
Questions and Answers" presented at a conference on "Competition and Regulation of
Health Services-Are They Compatible?" sponsored by the Project Hope Institute for
Health Policy Studies. The conference was held at Millwood, Virginia, on May 22-25, 1980.
** Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B., 1955, Princeton University; J.D., 1958,
Northwestern University.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 103(a), 93 Stat. 594 (amending § 1502(a) of the Public Health
Service Act).
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general theory supporting increased reliance on market forces, the
Article turns to the key arguments advanced against that theory.
The issues are many and complex, and the Article makes no at-
tempt to treat them exhaustively. Rather, the aim is to highlight
the weak as well as the strong points for and against competition
in a manner that focuses the controversy and clarifies the issues.
Until very recently, market advocates could responsibly dis-
cuss competition only in a general way, emphasizing its many sub-
stantial strengths in comparison to regulation's weaknesses. Now
that the goal of reopening the policy debate has been achieved,
however, market advocates have an increased responsibility to ad-
dress the hard questions, which have previously been treated in
footnotes or in theoretical pieces that escaped widespread atten-
tion. By the same token, the advocates of regulation now need to
admit its problems and to approach the market in a more con-
structive way, seeking both a better understanding of how the mar-
ket can function and solutions that do not too readily sacrifice the
market's strengths. This Article, then, is concerned principally
with establishing how competition can be used to obtain better
performance from the health services industry. That is, at the mo-
ment, the key issue in health policy.
II. COMMON THEMEs OF MARKET ADvocATEs
Informed advocates of a market-oriented strategy do not all
view issues in precisely the same way. Significant differences exist,
for example, regarding the need for regulation to structure and
limit the range of consumer choice in order to improve the intelli-
gibility of choices and to prevent improvident ones. There are also
some disagreements over how the transition to a more competitive
market should be made, particularly whether a single comprehen-
sive legislative enactment is necessary. Despite these differences of
tactics and emphasis, however, many common themes run through
the thinking of market advocates that can be usefully reviewed to
discover the essentials of the market approach.
Market advocates have often argued their case by painting a
rosy picture of what a competitive health care system would look
like. Their visions of competing delivery systems, each priced ac-
cording to its costs and chosen by consumers on the basis of quali-
ty, cost, and other factors, are beguiling and have attracted policy-
makers' interest. Though highly speculative, such scenarios have
been a natural response to the claims of regulation advocates, who,
because they recommend direct command-and-control interven-
[Vol. 34:1117
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tion, can promise specific and concrete results. Advocacy-by-scena-
rio has also been helpful in communicating the competition idea to
audiences that have only an imperfect grasp of the underlying the-
ory. Nevertheless, this "rosy picture" way of presenting the market
strategy has the disadvantage of inviting challenges over whether
the advocates' predictions-for growth of health maintenance or-
ganizations (HMOs), for example-would really come true and
whether people would really be better off if they did. Market advo-
cates have adopted this style of advocacy largely because the
health care world is unfamiliar with competition and perceives it
as either a radical or a reactionary idea. The resulting need to por-
tray competition in attractive and nonconceptual terms helps to
explain both why most discussions of competition quickly focus on
the prospects and merits of HMOs and why the market strategy
sometimes sounds simplistic and utopian.
Although my own advocacy of greater reliance on competition
has also included some speculation about how the market might
deal with the cost problem if given a chance, I have tried to em-
phasize the need for competitively inspired experimentation with
new techniques and to disavow predictions or prescriptions. To
my mind, it has seemed vital to stress, not the probable outcome of
competition, but the process by which a particular allocation of
resources is arrived at. The competitive process, if it does in fact
allow people to reveal the strength of their varying preferences,
goes far toward legitimizing market outcomes-even if they are not
to some experts' or policymakers' liking. Although other market
advocates3 would probably agree with the ethical judgment im-
plicit in my preference for consumer (rather than political) choice
as the best guide to the public interest in this complex field, they
are usually not as explicit about such matters. Nevertheless, they
too focus first on the cost problem as a candidate for public or
private attention and then on the relative efficacy and attractive-
2. Havighurst, Private Cost Containment-Medical Practice Under Competition, in
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES OF HEALTH, 1979 at 41 (G. Misek ed.); Havighurst, Professional Re-
straints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 321-34; Havighurst
& Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1298 (1979).
3. Of course, a complete list of market advocates cannot be presented here, but any
list must include Professor Alain Enthoven of Stanford University School of Business and
Paul Ellwood, M.D., and Walter McClure, Ph.D., of InterStudy, a Minneapolis health policy
research group. Also meriting special mention is David Stockman, formerly a congressman
from Michigan and now Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Reagan
Administration. Mr. Stockman was instrumental in introducing the market strategy into the
health policy debate in Washington.
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ness oftthe various political and market processes for registering
individual preferences with respect to health care spending.
A. Major Problems in Health Policy
1. Complex Benefit/Cost Tradeoffs
The central fact bedevilling health policy is the existence of
extraordinarily complex quality/cost tradeoffs, and the central pol-
icy issue is how these tradeoffs are to be addressed.4 Each encoun-
ter between a patient and the health care system presents a unique
set of problems. The risks and probability of medical benefits vary
widely from case to case, as do the circumstances and preferences
of the individuals involved. At each stage of diagnosis and treat-
ment, as well as in the design of myriad system inputs, a multiplic-
ity of choices are presented, many of them extraordinarily complex
when viewed in benefit/cost terms. Not only are large dollar costs
involved, but, on the benefit side, great uncertainties exist concern-
ing everything from diagnoses and the efficacy of some major ther-
apies to the value of the specific health benefit sought. At the mar-
gin, decisions about whether to provide a little more, or a little
better, service constantly encounter the law of diminishing returns.
The cumulative effect of the multitude of provider and patient
choices-both the big choices, such as whether to make a major
capital investment or to initiate a costly therapy, and the little
ones, such as whether to provide added increments of quality or
service-is of immense social significance. Health policy analysts
have come to believe, on the basis of impressions, theory, and both
anecdotal and statistical evidence, that removing cost from the
calculus of providers and patients has caused systematic neglect of
important tradeoffs and a severe misallocation of resources. Al-
though we have no clear idea how much money is excessively spent
on health services or even whether an ideal system would in fact
spend less, we do know that the system that has yielded the pre-
sent allocation of resources is not one that reliably translates indi-
vidual or societal preferences into provider and patient behavior.
Health policy is concerned with discovering and instituting a sys-
4. Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care:
The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 9-20 (1975). Other analysts also recognize that the
problem is not simply the elimination of fat or waste-that is, purely unproductive expendi-
tures. See L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HosPrrALs 1-6 (1979); Schwartz & Joskow, Medical
Efficacy Versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1462
(1978).
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tern that succeeds in capturing all the relevant factors and in
translating them into performance. Market advocates believe that
restoring crucial links between consumption and spending will al-
low private incentives to discipline the system and thereby legiti-
mize the system's performance and its claims on resources. They
believe that competition is the best way to transmit roughly cor-
rect signals to the participants in crucial spending decisions and to
communicate consumer preferences concerning complex tradeoffs
to the prescribers and providers of services.
2. Ineffective Regulation
Market advocates doubt that the highly personal, highly indi-
vidualized business of prescribing, providing, and consuming
health services is amenable to effective regulatory control. Their
instincts are confirmed by the fact that attempts to impose artifi-
cial constraints on the market have generally failed to achieve ap-
preciable cost containment. The disappointing results of efforts to
limit the supply of capital facilities (through certificate-of-need
laws) 5 and the flow of funds to hospitals (through hospital rate or
revenue controls) 6 seem to have been politically inevitable, a reflec-
tion of the public's misunderstanding of any effort to ration health
care. I have propounded the theory that regulation cannot afford
to be sensitive to claims of "need" or "quality of care" precisely
because regulators operate in a political environment.7 That envi-
ronment, while supplying few cost-containment incentives, threat-
ens to penalize any apparent weakness in adherence to symbolic
health goals. Lacking a solid methodology for making benefit/cost
tradeoffs, regulators cannot consistently say "no" to facilities and
services that would be nice to have or to spending that is directly
linked to "quality" or a desirable service.
If it is to be effective in containing costs, regulation must be
arbitrarily unconcerned in any specific way with needs, quality,
and tradeoffs. This view was confirmed by the use of arbitrary
5. See, e.g., D. SALKEvER & T. BICE, HosPITAL CERTIFICATE-oF-NEED CONTROLS 51
(1979); Sloan & Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Use, 23 J.L. &
EcoN. 81, 83-85 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Impact of the Economic Stabilization Program on Hospitals, in
HosPrrAL COST CONTAINMENT 293 (M. Zubkoff, I. Raskin & R. Hanft eds. 1978); Sloan &
Steinwald, supra note 5. But see Biles, Schramm & Atkinson, Hospital Cost Inflation under
State Rate-Setting Programs, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 664 (1980); F. Sloan, Regulation and
the Rising Cost of Hospital Care (1980) (unpublished paper on file with the author).
7. See Havighurst, Health Care Cost-Containment Regulation: Prospects and an Al-
ternative, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 313-15 (1977).
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mathematical formulas in the Carter Administration's hospital
cost-containment proposal s and the national health planning
guidelines.' More recently, arbitrary budget cutting, justified by
references to a hemorrhaging federal budget, has shown the cost-
saving potential of insensitivity in many fields. Despite its poten-
tial effectiveness, however, arbitrary regulation is basically unat-
tractive in a pluralistic society and thus politically untenable. The
ultimate arbitrary cost control is, of course, the fixed-budget ap-
proach to health care financing, which has been proposed both for
capital expenditures and for the entire health care system under
variations of the British model.
To the market advocate's mind, complex tradeoffs of the sort
encountered in medical care cannot be addressed well in a
politicized system in which even unproved benefits have high sym-
bolic value, costs are hidden, and interest groups possess the bal-
ance of power on specific choices. Imperfect as it may always be,
the competitive market represents, potentially at least, a situation
in which consumers can see the benefits of economizing in tangible
terms and in which each economizing choice benefits the individual
involved rather than a governmental or some other deep pocket.
Indeed, only when most of the benefits and costs of economizing
behavior accrue to or are borne by the same party can one reasona-
bly hope that the symbolism that pervades the health care enter-
prise will not unduly dominate decisionmaking. It is the sense that
private decisionmaking can better cope with difficult trade-
offs-"tragic choices" that would be demoralizing to the body poli-
ticI°-that leads market advocates to believe that they have found
a better way.
3. Artificial Obstacles to Market Efficiency
Market advocates have focused primarily on the private sector
and its failings rather than public sector health programs. The
market strategy proceeds from a belief that consumers did not
8. See S. 570, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 2187 (1979); H.R. 2626, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1106 (1979); S. 1391, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
12179 (1977); H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 12082 (1977). The arbitrari-
ness of the Carter cost-containment proposal was the primary reason Congress received it
unenthusiastically. Ultimately, the House of Representatives voted down even an amended
version of the proposal riddled with exceptions and qualifications. 125 CONG. REc. H10809
(daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
9. 42 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-.211 (1980).
10. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBiTT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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willingly surrender their spending discretion to providers but in-
stead were prevented by artificial constraints from revealing their
true wishes. With this perception, the market advocate looks for
important changes to occur following the removal of some or all of
the obstacles that have prevented the market from working well in
the past. As developed below, the most substantial of these obsta-
cles include: unwise tax subsidies for the purchase of private
health insurance; restraints of trade imposed by providers on each
other and on innovative prepayment plans; the purchase of insur-
ance by employers and unions fearful of appearing to economize at
workers' expense; government financing programs and reimburse-
ment policies; and regulation itself. Each of these specific demand-
distorting or supply-inhibiting factors is deemed by market advo-
cates to be substantially remediable by relatively straightforward
actions that government might take. For this reason, market advo-
cates are not put off by the charge that the market has already
failed; instead, they see great potential for private sector change
resulting from policies that alter incentives and restore bargaining
opportunities and power to consumers.
Market advocates do not accept the argument that the health
services industry is in some technical respect unsuited for disci-
pline by market forces. Rather, they see numerous opportunities
for consumers to have their interests effectively represented by
agents who assist them in purchasing wisely, in curbing exploita-
tion of the insurance funds, and in forcing providers to compete in
the sale of their services. Providers long ago perceived grave dan-
gers to themselves from the introduction of private health insur-
ance. They feared that health insurers, if permitted to act as con-
sumers' purchasing agents, would introduce powerful competitive
forces into providers' markets,"- and they took steps that effec-
tively prevented insurers from assuming an active role.1" Market
advocates are surprised that so many nonprovider observers are so
thoroughly conditioned by decades of experiencing only provider-
approved forms of insurance and of accepting provider versions of
the issues that they fail to see this same competitive potential.
11. See, e.g., COMMrrrEE ON THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 163-68 (1932) (referenced pages are part of a minority report filed by
representatives of organized medicine).
12. For an extensive discussion of this thesis, see Havighurst, Professional Restraints
on Innovation in Health Care Financing, supra note 2.
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4. Public Financing as a Subsidiary, but Not an Unimportant,
Issue
Market advocates have only secondarily addressed public pro-
grams-Medicare and Medicaid-largely because they perceive
them as having been modeled after those same private insurance
plans that have failed adequately to address the cost problem.
While advocates of increased regulation have long anticipated a fu-
ture dominated by expanded public financing programs and a
gradual reduction of the private health plans' role, recent develop-
ments in the national health insurance debate have borne out com-
petition advocates' view that private financing mechanisms con-
tinue to be important. Not only do recent proposals, particularly
Senator Kennedy's,13 preserve a substantial role for private insur-
ance and competition, but the shortage of federal resources to
launch new spending initiatives has also caused health policy in-
creasingly to focus on the private sector's actual and potential
performance.
The apparent disinterest of market advocates in public pro-
grams is sometimes interpreted as lack of concern for the benefi-
ciaries of those programs and for the large number of other citizens
whose health needs are not well met. Moreover, because the mar-
ket's reliance on willingness to pay would necessarily give rise to
consumption differences reflecting ability to pay, the market advo-
cate is again vulnerable to the charge of neglecting social justice.
The initial defense offered is that a market-oriented system does
not preclude equity. It may be necessary, however, in a market sys-
tem for government subsidies to be supplied not through direct
financing and reimbursement programs but by assisting public
beneficiaries to purchase private financial protection. Market advo-
cates view a voucher-type system, embodying approaches similar to
those in the most recent Kennedy proposal, the Enthoven Con-
sumer-Choice Health Plan,14 and the pending HMO option for
Medicare beneficiaries, 15 as a promising idea capable of meeting
social goals by strengthening rather than undercutting competi-
tion. Now that the voucher system is potentially available, market
advocates can claim that restoration of vigorous price competition
13. See S. 1720, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 12048 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
14. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (pts. 1-2), 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 650,
709 (1978). See also A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980).
15. E.g., H.R. 2508, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 941 (daily ed. March 12,
1981). The HMO option for Medicare is discussed in text accompanying notes 16-18 infra.
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in the private sector would actually facilitate new government ac-
tions to meet promises long unfulfilled.
In answer to the claim that basing health care on ability to
pay creates inequalities,, it can be observed that public subsidies
can shift substantially the margin at which lower income people
will confront a serious cost constraint. Moreover, some regulation
of the choices made available to public beneficiaries would be ap-
propriate to prevent severe or frequent hardships. On these
grounds, it can be asserted that a market system would not be in-
compatible with at least some commonly held views of social jus-
tice. Those who would object to the residual inequalities would
seem to have the burden of overcoming competing ethical views
concerning the value of individual choice and responsibility, the
evidence that equality may not be achievable in. fact, and the argu-
ment that efficiency counts too.
B. Market-Inspired Approaches to the Cost Problem
1. Health Maintenance Organizations
From the beginning, the market strategy for dealing with
health care costs has been closely identified with the HMO move-
ment. This equation of HMOs and competition has occurred nat-
urally for two reasons: first, HMOs are the most tangible and
substantial competitive development thus far, and second, compe-
tition advocates have found it helpful to refer to HMOs to illus-
trate their theories. Treating HMOs as synonymous with competi-
tion, rather than as merely one example of it, has, however, also
served the interests of some important groups opposed to the mar-
ket-oriented approach. For example, government officials and
those who look primarily to government for valid reforms have
been comfortable with HMOs because they have been federally
sponsored since 197316 and might be claimed as a success of gov-
ernment rather than of the market. More ominously, as long as
group-practice HMOs are the only recognized vehicle for importing
competition into health services, the competitive threat to the
medical profession is effectively isolated and can be more readily
combatted by local providers.
While federal support for HMOs may have legitimized and en-
couraged one type of innovation, it may have discouraged others,
16. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
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and therefore prevented vigorous competition from occurring. In-
deed, traditional but inefficient financing mechanisms may actually
have gained legitimacy from the presence of a federally approved
alternative whose stated merits seemed to confirm that third-party
insurers' payment methods could not be expected to change. Thus,
the HMO movement may have given health insurers a convenient
excuse for not competing in ways that would alter their basic prod-
uct. Further, HMOs themselves, while they appear to be instru-
ments of change, have been quite satisfied to face potential compe-
tition only from other HMOs. It is thus possible that, in subtle
ways, the HMO movement has served to confine and limit compe-
tition as much as to foster it and that HMO development has been
primarily an innocuous exercise in pluralism, emphasizing the
availability of a nice alternative rather than real, hard competition.
Certainly the dual-choice provisions of the Federal HMO Act"
carry a strong implication that a single independent HMO is all
that a community requires. Acceptance of HMOs sponsored by or-
ganized medicine also suggests that the government has been more
interested in organizational reform and the expansion of choice
than in competition.
Market advocates have recently sought to expand the discus-
sion to give competitive innovations other than HMOs equal
credence in order that HMOs will be viewed as simply one species
of the innovations that might occur in a competitive market. The
debate over competition in the health care sector has now reached
the point at which it is most important to recognize that the cost-
containment problem confronts, and can and should be addressed
by, health care plans of all types. The key insight is that the cost
problem is attributable to the monopolistic freedom enjoyed by
providers in their pricing and output decisions. Providers' discre-
tionary power can probably be addressed fully and effectively only
if there is active bargaining-that is, competition-at the crucial
interface between individual health plans on the one hand and in-
dividual providers on the other. In order to appreciate the poten-
tial of this market, however, one must begin by conceptualizing the
cost-containment problem as a whole rather than by settling upon
some particular solution, such as the HMO model. Competition is,
after all, a dynamic process, not a thing, and its most prominent
feature, which is also a reflection of its greatest strength, is that its
achievements cannot be predicted reliably in advance. While one
17. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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can make guesses about the directions in which competition-in-
duced change would take us, it is dangerous to try to sell competi-
tion on any basis other than the argument that promising opportu-
nities for innovation exist and that consumers should have the
chance to buy in a market that encourages efforts to serve them
better.'8
2. Explicit Exclusions from Coverage in Private Insurance
Cost containment in an insurance or other risk-sharing and
cost-hiding plan is essentially an administrative problem. In a
competitive market, cost-containment measures would have to be
acceptable to both patients and providers, each deciding for him-
self whether to participate in a particular plan. As a conceptual
matter, an insurance plan is not in the business of providing ser-
vices and can deal with costs only by varying its coverage-that is,
its contractual commitment to pay particular expenses. It can limit
coverage on dollar lines by imposing copayments, deductibles, and
policy limits on what it will pay in the aggregate or in particular
circumstances. Alternatively or additionally, a plan can limit its
obligation to pay for particular services, some of which might be
totally or partially excluded from coverage because they are so
highly discretionary in particular cases (and thus so prone to the
effects of moral hazard"") that to insure fully against the need for
them would be too costly. Yet another way to curb patient-pro-
vider discretion in spending the insurer's funds would be to agree
to pay for a service only under specified conditions. For example,
the insurer might require that it be given an opportunity to deter-
mine in advance the extent of its responsibility to pay for recom-
mended hospitalization or treatment.
These cost-containment strategies available to insurers would
present various administrative difficulties, and the costs of over-
coming these would, in a competitive climate, be relevant to the
decision whether to adopt particular measures. Nevertheless, when
such techniques could be introduced at reasonable cost, consumers
might find the lower premium to be advantageous despite the
greater exposure to certain risks. In a competitive market, one
would expect to find a great deal of experimentation with such
18. For further development of this thesis, see Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 2.
19. "Moral hazard" is the term economists assign to the propensity of patients and
physicians to consume more resources and services when they know an insurer or other
third-party payer will pay the resulting bill.
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cost-containment techniques.
Because explicit exclusions from insurance coverage would be
difficult to administer without provider cooperation, one could ex-
pect that insurers would enter into contractual understandings
with providers. Under such participation agreements, providers
would become obligated to disclose potential costs to the patient
and to submit certain cases for prior authorization or predetermi-
nation of benefits. In a competitive world, some providers would
accept such agreements, while others would not; all providers, how-
ever, would have a competitive incentive to agree to such limita-
tions because they would thereby become more attractive to the
plan's beneficiaries. An insurer might exclude services provided by
nonparticipating physicians and hospitals from coverage alto-
gether, or it might simply pay for their services on a less advanta-
geous basis, reflecting the higher costs that their uncooperativeness
creates for the plan as a whole.
3. Closed-Panel or Preferred-Provider Coverage
Rather than exclude certain services from coverage, an insurer
might exclude providers, limiting its coverage to services obtained
from a closed set of physicians or hospitals, such as a prepaid
group practice, an IPA°2 0 or a "health care alliance.""1 By ex-
tending eligibility to render covered services only to efficient prov-
iders who are perceived to render and prescribe only services that
are worth their costs, the plan could effectively limit its coverage of
questionable items without explicitly excluding specific services.
These plans closely resemble HMOs and would qualify as HMOs
under some definitions, but their more important characteristic is
20. An "individual practice association" (]PA) is a group of physicians who practice
independently of one another but who through the association contract with a health plan
to provide medical services to the plan's enrollees. The contract specifies the terms of pay-
ment (usually fee-for-service) and utilization controls; under the contract, the physicians
may also agree to bear some of the financial risk from an unexpectedly high utilization of
services.
21. A "health care alliance" is a set of physicians and perhaps a hospital selected by
an insurer to provide health care to the insurer's enrollees. The premium paid to the insurer
by the enrollees reflects only the costs generated by that set of participating providers, not
those of the provider community at large as in the case of a conventional open-panel health
plan. A provider participating in a health care alliance retains the same patients as he had
before joining the alliance; he also practices in the same location and receives payment in
the same way. The only difference is that the underwriter evaluates the cost of the partici-
pating providers separately and assigns coverage for their services to a separate premium.
Thus, services of the participating providers are marketed independently from those of
other providers.
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that they divide the provider community into competing groups. A
similar effect can be obtained if the plan identifies "preferred
providers" and, instead of requiring that all covered services be ob-
tained from them, simply gives subscribers an economic incentive
to patronize the efficient group.2 2 The plan could provide such an
incentive, as in prescription drug prepayment plans, 2 by paying
for services obtained from other providers on a less advantageous
basis-requiring a larger copayment from subscribers, for example.
Many consumers would, of course, prefer never to confront the
hard choice of whether to spend their own money on services that
were not fully covered by insurance and about which the physician
was uncertain or to forgo the service. Indeed, one seldom noted
advantage of the HMO model is that it presents the consumer with
few such choices, leaving medical determinations to the providers
themselves. One would suppose, however, that consumers would
have varying reactions to giving up their freedom of choice about
how much to spend on a specific health need. A competitive mar-
ket would allow a consumer to elect whether to put himself en-
tirely in the provider's hands, as in an HMO, or to purchase a plan
that preserves his discretion to choose what he wants with profes-
sional advice and the costs in view.
The closed-panel or preferred-provider model, like explicit ex-
clusions from coverage, would be greatly facilitated by the use of
provider participation agreements. Indeed, such agreements may
be very nearly essential both to cost-conscious health plans and to
a competitive system in which organized plans, competing among
themselves to keep factor prices low, force providers into unwanted
competition. It is possible, however, that an insurer, having identi-
fied a group of providers-a multispecialty group practice, for ex-
ample-whose charges, efficiency, and style of practice assure
lower costs, might offer individual insureds a lower premium or
broader benefits if they agree to confine their patronage to such
providers. In this way, providers might be put at risk and forced
into competition even without their consent. Perhaps other crea-
tive techniques might also be developed. In general, it will be ob-
served that potential innovations in financing and delivery lie at
numerous points along the inadequately explored spectrum be-
tween traditional insurance and service-benefit plans on the one
hand and group-practice HMOs on the other.
22. A plan using this technique may be called a "preferred provider organization."
23. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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C. Summary
This brief discussion suggests that the redesign of private
health care financing is both possible and promising as a way to
reduce the heavy burden of moral hazard that is carried by medi-
cal insurance. The market strategy is based on the belief that if
cost-conscious consumers can purchase health plans in a competi-
tive market, they will transmit to insurers, who will in turn trans-
mit to providers, their concern about health care costs. An in-
surer's objective in such a market would be to contain costs while
preserving essential coverage and providing the patient with access
to providers of acceptable quality.
Providers, too, would be able to operate free of external con-
straints in such a market, except that they would be accountable to
consumers for the costs and other conditions of care. Thus, effi-
ciency would be rewarded. Moreover, the continuing opportunity
for both lay and provider entrepreneurs to organize new alterna-
tives should assure both consumers and providers that their vari-
ous needs and preferences will continue to be served. At the same
time, a competitive market requires its participants to adapt to
changing needs and preferences and to experiment with new ways
of balancing constantly changing competing factors. These features
of competition, which make it a workable and sensitive means of
addressing the central problem of tradeoffs, give it a strong claim
to play a central role in allocating resources in this unruly
industry.
This review of the conceptual foundations of the market strat-
egy leaves many questions unanswered. The remainder of this Ar-
ticle indentifies the issues and arguments that have been or might
be raised in opposition to a procompetitive policy, and sketches
the market advocates' response to those challenges. Since the aim
is to touch generally on a comprehensive range of problems, identi-
fied issues are treated in a highly abbreviated fashion. Some of the
responses will be less satisfying than others because, although
some of the issues are largely false ones, others are real, and some
important uncertainties do exist. My belief is, however, that once
the market advocates' positions are clarified, the range of misun-
derstanding and disagreement will be reduced.
IIL CLAIMED PROBLEMS WITH THE MARKET APPROACH
A. Objections to Market Theory
Many authorities believe there are numerous technical
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problems inherent in the marketplace that make it unlikely that it
could function well in allocating resources to and within the health
services industry. The following discussion presents and rejects the
most common criticisms of the market approach.
1. The health services industry does not fit the textbook model
of a competitive market.
Certainly the health services market is unusual in many re-
spects. Third parties pay the bills for many highly discretionary
services, and consumers find it difficult to know in advance what
they are buying. The fact that the health care industry deviates
from the textbook model of competition is unimportant, however;
the textbook model of regulation is also unfulfilled-as earlier dis-
cussion of regulatory politics has shown.24 Thus, rather than reject
the market because the industry is not perfectly suited to it, the
proper inquiry is to compare imperfect competition with imperfect
regulation. The fact is that many less than perfect markets func-
tion rather well over the long term, featuring a dynamism and
adaptability that are quite impressive compared to those qualities
in regulated markets.2 5 None of the health care market's imperfec-
tions amounts to a true market failure of the sort that textbooks
recognize as a justification for regulatory intervention.
2. Consumers are ill-informed about medical services.
Consumers are strongly motivated to, and often do, finds ways
of coping with their ignorance of medical services. Their best strat-
egy is to select knowledgeable agents to help them make decisions
about technical matters, and clearly the physician serves the pa-
tient in this professional capacity. In a competitive environment,
consumers will have new needs for information, particularly about
costs, and the market strategy contemplates that market forces
will stimulate the production of needed information both in the
form of advertising and in the form of more cost-sensitive profes-
sional advice. Because "free rider" problems do reduce the quanti-
24. For more general discussion of how real world regulation differs from the model of
regulation, see Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, 11 NAT'L J. 711 (1979);
Wolf, Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J. &
EcoN. 107, 132-38 (1979).
25. An overview of the economic theory of market concentration and some of the per-
tinent empirical literature can be found in R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 178-97 (1978).
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ty of information generated in a free market,"6 however, govern-
ment has a legitimate role in generating additional information.
Under competition, physicians will ultimately organize, or be
organized into, competing groups, with the result that consumers'
choices will be simplified. Each group, in attempting to earn a rep-
utation for giving good quality care at a low cost, would act, in
effect, as the consumer's agent in selecting providers. Paradoxi-
cally, although the consumer in such a market would have fewer
options, competition would be more intense because comparative
information would be available on the competing groups and
choices would thus be more informed. It is possible to understand
the medical profession's historical opposition to group practice
only if one appreciates consumers' difficulty in buying intelligently
in markets that are so fragmented that their individual experiences
are unlikely to overlap, making useful comparative evaluations dif-
ficult to obtain.
3. Shifting the cost burden to consumers is unlikely to reduce
health care costs, since it is physicians who make
health care decisions.
Just as nonprice competition has encouraged doctors not to
economize, competition that occurs with costs in view can alter be-
havior in the other direction. As things have stood, physicians who
appeared to economize in spending third parties' money lost pa-
tients, and physicians naturally developed a sense that economiz-
ing that did not benefit the patient was unethical. Physicians, how-
ever, did, do, and will behave differently when costs matter to the
patient, and indeed they have already proved to be quite creative
in economizing when they perceive it to be part of their profes-
sional service. Of course, fraud is always possible, but there are
innumerable influences that should curb its incidence. Moreover, if
patients perceive fraud by fee-for-service doctors to be a problem,
they can resort to more organized plans, such as HMOs. Building
on the traditional doctor-patient relationship is the best strategy
to reduce costs, for physicians are likely to change their style of
26. Economists apply the term "free rider" to those individuals who benefit from the
productive efforts of others without having contributed themselves. Because they can bene-
fit without paying, free riders do not compensate the productive firm for its efforts, and
therefore deny the firm its just reward. If there are many free riders, the productive firm
may not be able to earn enough to justify its efforts. Free riding is particularly common
when the firm's product is information, since it is difficult for a firm to control the dissemi-
nation of information and thus to limit its use to paying customers.
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practice substantially only when they perceive that it is in their
patients' interest-and thus in their own competitive interest-to
do so.
4. Consumers are ill-informed about insurance.
Most consumers are now grouped in ways that allow them to
obtain expert assistance in choosing insurance packages, and this
feature of the market should be preserved. Under the multiple-
choice approach for example, employers and unions would screen
the choices presented to individuals. While there is a great deal of
sentiment for prescribing minimum benefit packages as a protec-
tion against consumer mistakes, it would be a serious policy error
to substitute regulation for group choices. Such regulation would
deprive insurers of the opportunity to vary coverage as a method
of cost containment, a strategy that seems to me to have great
promise. Although some regulation of the scope of individual, as
opposed to group, coverage would probably be appropriate, one
would hope that the market for group coverage rather than regula-
tors' own preferences would provide the main reference point for
determining which exclusions from coverage are tolerable.
5. The third-party payment system impedes market
functioning.
The problem is not third-party payment as such but the way
in which it is designed and administered. Currently, Americans
have too much of the wrong kinds of insurance. As noted above, in
a truly competitive market, health insurance plans would look sig-
nificantly different. Indeed, they might not be insurance in the
technical sense at all. Decisions about spending the insurer's
money would be subject to substantial conditions imposed in the
interest of the insurance fund and those who contribute to it.
6. The prevalence of nonprofit firms impedes market
functioning.
Even nonprofit firms have to break even, and they like to earn
enough profits to finance desired growth. On the other hand, al-
though they do respond to basic market signals, they are slower to
enter and to leave the market than for-profit firms, which respond
more quickly to profit potential and seek to conserve their owners'
capital when the enterprise is failing. More serious than the some-
what unusual incentives of the nonprofit firm, however, are the
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special advantages conferred on them by government, mostly in
the form of tax benefits. Because nonprofit firms enjoy these com-
petitive advantages, innovative for-profit firms may be reluctant to
enter a market in which nonprofit firms are present. Finally, the
nonprofit firm lends itself to domination by those whose interests
lie not in advancing the firm's own welfare but elsewhere-perhaps
in preserving the noncompetitive status quo in provider markets.
The antitrust laws are being invoked to deal with some egregious
manifestations of this problem.2
It seems unlikely that the market would be disabled by the
presence of nonprofit firms if they did not enjoy special govern-
ment-conferred advantages. The nonprofit form of organization
can best be understood in health care settings as a legal device al-
lowing a firm to give its customers some assurance that their wel-
fare will not be sacrificed to the profit motive.28 Once adoption of
the nonprofit form is understood as simply a marketing strategy,
no good reason exists why government should subsidize the firms
that adopt it.
7. Even if the market works in urban areas, it will fail in rural
areas where providers are few in number.
To begin with, rural areas present few cost problems at the
moment. Moreover, they should benefit from competition in urban
areas because physicians whose market opportunities in the cities
are increasingly constricted will spill over into less populous ar-
eas. 9 Many new rural practitioners will be agents of organized
health plans, and their close ties to efficient systems promise im-
proved quality and lower cost. In addition, residents of rural areas
already face monopoly in many forms, and it should not be crucial
that providers' monopoly power might be somewhat greater in ru-
ral areas. Most rural hospitals are nonprofit institutions, and ex-
cess profit normally will be plowed back into services. More impor-
27. Settlement Agreement, Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., No. C-2-75-473 (S.D.
Ohio, settled March 22, 1979) (on file with the author). See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, STAFF REPORT ON PHYSICIAN CONTROL OF BLUE SHIrLD PLANS (1979) (proposing that
physician organizations be barred from controlling nonprofit health plans such as Blue
Shield because those plans can be used to attenuate price competition in the market for
physician services).
28. See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1417, 1447 (1980); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844 &
n.34 (1980).
29. See also Schwartz, Newhouse, Bennett & Williams, The Changing Geographic
Distribution of Board-Certified Physicians, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1032 (1980).
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tantly, the relevant market within which to assess monopoly power
varies greatly with the service in question. For those services that
are extremely expensive and present the greatest cost problems,
the market area in which rural residents would shop is much larger
than a single community. In such a case, it is of little consequence
that the local health services market is monopolistic.
8. The market has failed already.
Perhaps the greatest fallacy of all is that consumers have al-
ready indicated the kind of health insurance they want-namely,
comprehensive coverage without appreciable cost controls. The
market evidence on this score is misleading because consumers
have never been offered a full range of options under conditions
calculated to reveal their true preferences. The factors that ac-
count for the market's failure to offer a full range of choices also
suggest the solutions that should be adopted. As discussed more
fully below, the market's poor performance can be persuasively at-
tributed to the tax laws, private restraints of trade, the fact that
unions and employers rather than individuals purchase health in-
surance, the design of government financing programs, and regula-
tion itself. The striking thing about this list is that every problem
it identifies-and any other problems are de minimis-can be rem-
edied by legislation, regulatory reform, or antitrust enforcement.
Later discussion elaborates the remedies required. Until such rem-
edies are imposed, it cannot be claimed that the market has had its
chance.
B. Doubts About the Anticipated Increase in Competition
Among Health Plans
1. Health insurers already compete actively among themselves;
thus, one should not expect much benefit from
increased competition.
Although the health insurance industry is quite competitive in
some respects, insurers still do not compete very actively in the
purchase of their product's most important inputs-namely, prov-
iders' services. Insurers do compete over benefit packages, service,
and administration, as well as in risk selection. They do not, how-
ever, bargain with providers over price and utilization con-
trols-except by occasionally negotiating with a medical society.
Placidity rather than competition prevails at the interface between
plans and providers primarily because providers have in the past
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collectively and effectively prevented insurers from acting as con-
sumers' agents in procuring providers' services.3 0 It is likely that
antitrust enforcement aimed at provider-imposed restraints and
provider collective bargaining will permit cost-conscious insurers to
compete in enlisting providers' services on favorable terms and will
thus trigger competition among the providers themselves. Pressure
on insurers from newly cost-conscious employers is already begin-
ning to force cost-containment moves.
2. Since only a few health plans may compete in any given
market, competition cannot be vigorous.
In industrial settings, a scarcity of competitors impairs the in-
tensity of competition only when products are homogeneous and
opportunities for secret price-cutting and service competition are
few. Competing health plans will find it very difficult to collude
effectively because their services are heterogeneous and competi-
tion can take so many different forms. Government-sponsored col-
lusion and regulatory suppression of certain types of competition
may, however, impede vigorous competition. Thus, health planning
agencies, which have troublesome cartel features, could allocate ge-
ographic and service markets and prevent the introduction of new
services. Also, profession-sponsored Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSROs), acting in the name of quality, could un-
dermine plans that introduce cost-saving innovations; indeed, giv-
ing providers any self-regulatory role raises the possibility that
those powers will be used selectively to discipline those who com-
pete too aggressively. s Finally, government regulation of benefit
packages and pricing practices, particularly insistence on commu-
nity rating, 2 could easily reduce health plans' competitive flex-
ibility to a point at which explicit or tacit collusion on price would
be a real danger.
Beyond these considerations, one must consider how entry
conditions might affect oligopolistic behavior. Although entry into
the HMO market has been costly and time-consuming, it should
become easier in the future. Also, once competition becomes more
30. For a detailed discussion of this thesis, see Havighurst, Professional Restraints on
Innovation in Health Care Financing, supra note 2.
31. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and
Health Maintenance Organizations: Are They Compatible? 1975 UTAH L. REv. 381, 401-11.
32. A health plan "community rates" its coverage when it charges all enrollees the
same premium for the same benefits, regardless of the individual enrollee's actual health
status or actuarial category.
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familiar and physicians fall more naturally into competing groups,
a commercial insurer with an innovative program to offer needs
only a salesman and some local organizers to enter a new market or
seek a new account. With capital requirements low and the anti-
trust laws enforced, potential competitors, threatening to enter the
market, should expose incumbents to the discipline of competition.
3. Commercial insurers do not possess sufficient "clout" to
challenge providers.
Insurers, assuming that they must deal with the medical pro-
fession as a whole, claim that they do not have sufficient market
power, acting independently, to challenge physicians. To remedy
this perceived deficiency, the commercial insurance industry has
sought an antitrust exemption to allow them to bargain collectively
with physician organizations. The insurers' diagnosis and sug-
gested remedy reflect not only their past experience with organized
medicine but also their own preference for not competing among
themselves in the procurement of inputs. With the antitrust laws
acting as a new deterrent to concerted action by the profession,
however, insurers are now much freer to impose special require-
ments. Instead of giving insurers the right to bargain collectively,
antitrust enforcement should drive home the fact that collective
bargaining by providers as well as insurers violates the law. Then
countervailing power on the buyers' side of the market will not be
necessary.
Certainly insurers would prefer not to challenge the medical
profession, and their frequent statements that they are doing all
they can about health care costs may be simply an exchange of
assurances that they will not embark on a competitive course dis-
ruptive to the industry as a whole. Nevertheless, competition
forces competitors to do what they would prefer not to do, and it is
likely that the health care market will become more competitive as
the threat of provider restraints is diminished. It is possible to
view the situation in the past as one in which the medical cartel
disciplined an acquiescent insurer cartel to the mutual advantage
of each.
4. Competitive innovations are too risky for insurers.
Innovation is risky for insurers in the current climate. Organ-
ized medicine will resist efforts to alter the bargaining relationship
between insurers and providers, and antitrust law is not a complete
protection against the wrath of the medical profession. Innovation
1981] 1137
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
is financially risky as well. It will be costly for insurers to embark
on new programs that require them to negotiate new arrangements
with hostile providers, sell innovative plans to employment groups,
and introduce new administrative procedures. Moreover, an in-
surer's successes might have to be shared with its competitors. For
example, measures that effectively change the way in which physi-
cians practice may have automatic spillover effects on community
standards, thereby reducing other insurers' costs. In addition, com-
petitors can easily imitate the innovator's successful techniques,
with the result that, while the innovative firm bears the costs of
innovation and of unsuccessful ventures, it cannot hope to gain a
major competitive advantage from a successful one.33 Finally,
oligopolistic interdependence might sometimes discourage an in-
surer from undertaking competitive measures that could disrupt
the entire industry."' While it is far from clear that the foregoing
factors would inhibit all competitive moves, the possibility of slug-
gishness in innovation must be recognized. Goverment might
therefore usefully make demonstration grants to encourage the de-
sign and implementation of innovative financing schemes. Perhaps
health planners could smooth the way for innovations in local mar-
kets by helping to educate employers and employee groups-in ef-
fect, bearing some of an innovating insurer's planning and selling
costs. It is noteworthy in this connection that health systems agen-
cies (HSAs) have recently been given the new function of "preserv-
ing and improving . . . competition in the health service area.13 5
C. Provider Objections to the Market Approach
Many providers of health services question the desirability of
the market approach and argue that it will have unfair and disad-
vantageous effects on them and their ability to function effectively.
The following discussion examines the concerns of providers and
demonstrates that their objections are unfounded.
33. Professor Mark Pauly was among the first to call attention to the possibility of
such spillover effects and imitation and their adverse effect on insurer innovation. M.
PAULY, THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 30, 37-38 (Health
Insurance Association of America pub. 1979).
34. The possibility of such oligopolistic interdependence is discussed in Havighurst,
Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, supra note 2, at 336-42.
35. Health Planning and Resources DeVelopment Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-79, § 103(c), 93 Stat. 595 (amending § 1513(a) of the Public Health Service Act). HSAs
are areawide planning bodies created by Congress to help facilitate health planning.
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1. Promarket schemes allow insurers to discriminate unfairly
against qualified providers.
In a private market, buyers and sellers decide with whom they
will deal, and the law does not characterize a private party's deci-
sion to deal with one seller rather than another as discrimination.
Indeed, such selectivity is the essence of competition, and it would
be wrongheaded to deny consumers the right to have their agent
select providers for them or to deny efficient providers the oppor-
tunity to benefit from their greater attractiveness to consumers. In
medical services, the question is not simply a provider's qualifica-
tions, as the argument implies, but his willingness to meet the
terms offered. In a number of pending antitrust suits, providers are
claiming that insurance plans discriminate against them by refus-
ing to pay their higher fees, which they claim are justified by
higher quality or better service. 6 While these providers would like
to be included in a particular insurance plan's coverage, their
proper remedy is in the marketplace, where they are free to organ-
ize alternative plans and to compete with those plans that they
claim are not providing consumers with the coverage and services
they desire.
2. Insurers will exploit providers.
Because many insurers are large, providers fear that the insur-
ers would dominate any open health care market and would use
their preponderant bargaining power to exploit providers."7 Al-
though a monopsonist can sometimes exploit producers, potential
exploitation is an unlikely problem in these local markets since
providers are highly mobile and have the option of organizing com-
peting plans and marketing them to employers. Providers have in-
voked the monopsony fear to justify their own collective actions,
but it seems more likely that their joint efforts are designed to pro-
tect them from competition, not monopsony. In any event, the law
now provides remedies for monopsony where it exists"8 and does
not permit market power across the bargaining table to justify
cartelization.
36. See, e.g., Group Life. & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979);
Manasen v. California Dental Serv., No. C-75-0329 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 1980).
37. This argument is, of course, a contradiction of the insurers argument, mentioned
earlier, that insurers are impotent when dealing with providers.
38. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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3. Quality of care will suffer.
Many ways exist to reduce costs without impairing quality,39
and one would expect a competitive system to exploit those oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, many aspects of "quality" are unproved,
and competition should encourage closer attention to the benefits
and costs of many practices and procedures. It must also be ac-
knowledged that quality may be too high in some circum-
stances-in the sense that consumers would be better off spending
their money on other things. In a competitive world, some incre-
ments of quality might well be sacrificed on the ground that they
are so marginal as not to be worth their cost. On the other hand, a
competitive market might do a great deal to improve quality by
better organizing the delivery of services and by giving each com-
peting provider group a strong incentive to outperform others. Of
course, even while making these positive contributions, competi-
tion might also open some doors to poor quality that are currently
shut. This problem would undoubtedly be a matter for continuing
regulatory and professional attention.
4. Competition will undermine medical education and research.
To a significant though unknown degree, university and some
other medical centers depend on monopoly profits to finance edu-
cational and research endeavors. In a competitive world these re-
sources would undoubtedly be jeopardized. Nevertheless, the fact
that competition will deprive the industry of discretionary funds
with which it does things that it regards as desirable is not a suffi-
cient reason to forgo the benefits of competition. Rather, new sub-
sidies must be found to replace at least some of those that might
be eliminated by competition. Resorting to other sources of fund-
ing would bring heretofore hidden subsidies into the open and
would require new social judgments about the appropriateness of
each. Society may be unwilling to continue subsidies at the rate
they have been involuntarily provided in the past, and some wor-
thy activities may in fact go unfunded. Moreover, significant tran-
sitional problems would occur because one set of funds might dry
up at a rate that is not offset by the provision of new money. In
the final analysis, while the market strategy should not be rejected
simply because of the problems it will create, market advocates
39. See, e.g., Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture-Cutting Cost Without Cutting Quality of
Cdre, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1229 (1978).
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have some obligation to support efforts to replace the desirable
cross-subsidies that competition eliminates.
5. Federal subsidies to HMOs are not justifiable in a free
market.
Physicians are particularly critical of federal subsidies to
HMOs, which they regard as a cornerstone of the promarket strat-
egy. In fact, market advocates have not actively favored such sub-
sidies. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that, given the sub-
stantial barriers to entry that the medical profession artificially
created and long maintained against HMOs, a federal effort to
overcome those barriers was justified. It is arguable now, however,
that HMO subsidies are no longer needed but that other forms of
needed innovation should receive similar encouragement, particu-
larly in view of the impediments to insurer innovation noted
earlier.
6. Antitrust enforcement undermines the medical profession's
efforts to control costs.
The antitrust laws are based on the premise that competition
will solve market problems in due course. Even if this assumption
is incorrect in a particular situation, Congress must create any ex-
ceptions to the law's requirements, and so far it has not seen fit to
do so in the health care industry. It is no reflection on the sincerity
of those professionals who have attempted to upgrade the profes-
sion's overall performance to observe that they are operating in vi-
olation of fundamental antitrust principles. 40 Despite what may
well be worthy purposes, these providers, in thinking of the profes-
sion as an entity, have been proceeding on a monopolistic premise
rather than a competitive one, and the nation seems no longer will-
ing to rely on a benign monopoly to define and supply its health
care needs. Instead, we are embarking on an experiment with com-
petition. There is no denying the depth of the challenge that this
change of rules presents to traditional professional prerogatives,
but the idea of making physicians more accountable, not through
40. IPA-type HMOs controlled by local medical societies are widely credited with low-
ering health care costs, but they nevertheless raise important antitrust issues. See Havig-
hurst & Hackbarth, Enforcing the Rules of Free Enterprise in an Imperfect Market: The
Case of Individual Practice Associations, in HEALTH CAE-PRoFEssIONAL ETHICS, GOVERN-
MENT REGULATION OR MARKETS? (M. Olson ed.) (forthcoming).
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the political process but through the marketplace, requires no
apology.
D. Equitable Concerns with Market Theory
Some observers, even though they have nothing to lose di-
rectly from the introduction of competition, are nevertheless
troubled by the necessity for reintroducing ability to pay as a fac-
tor in consumption decisions. Because the potential impact on low-
income consumers is significant, the following discussion attempts
to put these issues in their proper context.
1. The market discriminates against the poor.
The nation is not yet committed to a system in which total
equality prevails in this or any other area. On the other hand,
there seems to be some commitment to providing a minimum level
of health services for everyone, a goal that could be achieved
within the context of a competitive system by subsidizing the
purchase of private coverage and by providing special protection
for uninsurables.41 As noted previously, reasons exist for thinking
that the reintroduction of competition, by generating new cost-
containment mechanisms and greater efficiency in the system,
would make it somewhat easier for society to extend public subsi-
dies to a larger population. As the market makes it more difficult
for providers to earn an adequate income by serving the middle
class, the supply of services available to low-income persons should
increase. In order to preserve the benefits of the competitive
model, however, even low-income persons must eventually face
some costs in some form at some margin. If public subsidies were
adequate, significant hardships would be rare. Hardship would be
further minimized by the system's residual charitable capacity and
by the availability of public hospitals and publicly subsidized
health centers as backstops for the public subsidy system. While
some inequalities would necessarily remain in such a system and
be deplored by some, probably the greater source of hardship
would be governmental unwillingness to provide the necessary
subsidies.
2. Hospitals will not be able to provide charitable care.
Cross-subsidies within hospitals are currently financing a great
41. See, e.g., Enthoven, supra note 14, at 651-52.
1142 [Vol. 34:1117
MARKET STRENGTHS
deal of indigent care, and competition surely threatens the contin-
uation of these subsidies. Thus, the fear that hospitals will be una-
ble to provide charitable care in an uncontrolled, competitive mar-
ket is not an unreasonable one. In the short run, denials of
certificates of need to new providers might be justified in extreme
cases by the need to protect internal subsidies supporting indigent
care, but one has to hope that, in the long run, hidden financing
will become unacceptable and will be replaced by new public
subsidies.
3. It is not certain that government will replace revenue sources
eroded by competition.
No one can guarantee that Congress will do what is just and
right, but at some point continuing back-door financing at high
cost may be regarded as less legitimate than putting the question
to Congress for a definitive reexamination of the public's obliga-
tions. Clearly, market advocates have some obligation to prevent
the market strategy from becoming a device for eroding the quality
and availability of care to low-income populations. It is not unrea-
sonable to expect that, once competition has taken hold, the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs will need to be redesigned to reallo-
cate their already committed funds in such a way as to provide
very nearly the same quality and availability of care to a much
larger population. Regrettably, however, government may continue
to rely on providers' charitable instincts as a basic source of financ-
ing to attain public objectives rather than merely counting on
charity as an ultimate protection against severe hardships that
may sometimes result from government and private cost-contain-
ment efforts.
E. Difficulties with the Explicit Exclusion and Closed-Panel
Strategies
As discussed earlier, insurers could use strategic exclusions
from coverage and selectivity among providers as cost-containment
strategies. 2 Some commentators, however, object to these ap-
proaches because they see them as departures from the ideal of
comprehensive benefits, uniform and universally high standards of
practice, and free choice of physician.
42. For a discussion of exclusions and closed provider panels, see text accompanying
notes 19-23 supra.
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1. Insurers should not engage in the corporate practice of
medicine or interfere in the doctor-patient relationship.
Exclusion of a service from coverage or limits on the amount
to be paid do not amount to the practice of medicine or dictation
to providers and patients. On the contrary, the doctor and the pa-
tient remain free to order the service if they deem it desirable in
light of all the factors, including the constraint introduced by the
patient's obligation to pay. If the insurance plan is well designed
-and competitive pressures should lead to well-designed insur-
ance-spending decisions would be faced under conditions in
which any hardship is not intolerable and is justified by the high
cost of avoiding it. Because selective coverage contemplates pa-
tients' decisionmaking with professional advice, it builds on, rather
than undercuts, the doctor-patient relationship.
2. Strategic exclusions from insurance coverage will create
hardships.
While many factors would contribute to keeping hardship at a
minimum, it probably could not and should not be avoided alto-
gether. In those rare instances where the patient was unable to pay
for a service that he and the physician thought was necessary,
there would be nothing wrong with expecting providers to give free
care, as they do now in a wide variety of circumstances. Indeed,
the system's ability to provide some charitable treatment, even
though substantially reduced by competition, should serve as an
important buffer against harmful side effects from cost-contain-
ment measures. The system has long accepted responsibilities of
this kind, and, while it would be unconscionable for government to
take advantage of private philanthropy and providers' charitable
instincts, no reason exists why this backstop should not be ac-
knowledged as a significant feature of a cost-conscious system.
3. Employers and unions will not tolerate the hardships
resulting from economizing choices.
Employers and unions have often pressured insurers to be lib-
eral in their payment decisions and reversed attempts to enforce
contractual limitations on coverage. In a multiple-choice situation,
however, it would be clear that the employee had benefitted from
his original economizing decision, and it should be easier to make
him bear the consequences. Even if occasional exceptions were
made out of charity, they would not vitiate the overall cost-con-
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tainment benefits anticipated.
4. Patients will be restricted in their choice of physicians.
Free choice is certainly desirable, but its cost is quite high.
Allowing every physician to serve the insured group on the same
terms means that the insurer has little opportunity to bargain and
providers have less reason to be efficient. While price competition
can operate as long as fees are not fully covered by the insurer,
utilization is hard to control-that is, exclusions from coverage are
hard to enforce-without explicit agreements with the providers;
this is true because many exclusions from coverage would be diffi-
cult to enforce retrospectively, making it highly desirable for prov-
iders to be obligated to seek prior authorization or predetermina-
tion of benefits.
In a competitive world, one would expect that free-choice
plans would be available but that their cost would be substantially
higher than plans that took aggressive action on costs. Free choice
is simply one of the many competing values that consumers must
weigh in deciding how they can get the best value for their money
in purchasing health services and financial protection. Preferred-
provider plans have the possibly attractive feature of allowing free
choice, subject to an incentive to accept the insurer's choice.
5. Fear of malpractice liability will discourage physicians from
suggesting less costly treatment alternatives to their patients.
There is no question that the malpractice courts are enforcing
a standard of care that, because it is drawn from existing practice,
embodies many of the system's distortions and its lack of cost con-
sciousness. One of the law's effects is to make any economizing
move suspect-hence, the problem of "defensive medicine." Never-
theless, health services research is beginning to legitimize certain
economizing efforts-the use of intensive care units, for exam-
ple'S-and courts should be willing to view such research findings
as evidence of due care. Moreover, courts should be more tolerant
of economizing when, as would occur in a competitive world, some
43. On efficiency in the use of intensive care units, see Mulley, Thibault, Hughes, Bar-
nett, Reder & Sherman, The Course of Patients with Suspected Myocardial Infarction:
The Identification of Low-Risk Patients for Early Transfer from Intensive Care, 302 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 943 (1980); Relman, Intensive Care Units: Who Needs Them?, 302 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 965 (1980); Thibault, Mulley, Barnett, Goldstein, Reder, Sherman & Skinner, Medi-
cal Intensive Care: Indications, Interventions, and Outcomes, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 938
(1980).
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of the cost saving accrues to the patient. Additionally, although
one should be wary of turning every economizing move into an "in-
formed consent" issue, the physician who had disclosed the availa-
ble options to the patient would run fewer risks of malpractice
liability.
The malpractice problem may be greatest for HMOs, since
their prepayment feature makes them appear to economize at the
.patient's expense rather than for his benefit." With respect to all
types of closed-panel plans, interesting possibilities exist for alter-
ing the legal regime by contract. Thus, an insurance policy or
health plan contract might provide for consultation with subscrib-
ers on the standard of care-about whether to use fetal monitor-
ing, for example-for arbitration of malpractice claims, or even for
a no-fault compensation scheme as the exclusive remedy for spe-
cific mishaps.45 Such innovative contract terms are another exam-
ple of the important dividends that can result from a competitive
environment.
IV. REMEDYING THE CURRENT MARKET FAILURE AND MOVING
TOWARD FREE COMPETITION
A. Correcting Existing Market Defects
As discussed earlier, the true causes of the market's past fail-
ures are remediable. Proposals now pending suggest changing the
tax laws, stepping up antitrust enforcement, and expanding the
range of choice in the employment setting-all in an effort to re-
move artificial constraints on the market. The following discussion
sets forth several of the proposed measures and indicates their re-
lation to an effectively functioning market system.
1. Reduce the tax subsidy for employer-purchased health
benefits.
Many believe that reducing the tax subsidy 8 would make no
44. See Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary
Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375.
45. On the use of a no-fault malpractice scheme by competitive health plans, see ABA
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILrY, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM:
A FEASmILrrY STUDY 57-61 (1979). See also Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insur-
ance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1233, 1273-79.
46. Under current law, employer contributions toward employee health benefits are
not included in the employee's taxable income. I.R.C. § 106. Although the exact extent of
the subsidy varies for individuals according to their tax bracket and whether incremental
wages are subject to FICA taxes, Martin Feldstein and Bernard Friedman have estimated
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difference because consumers have shown their preference for com-
prehensive coverage at whatever cost. One cannot predict with any
precision how much difference a tax change would make, but de-
mand for health insurance is surely not perfectly inelastic. Experi-
ence to date is an unreliable guide to consumer behavior because
consumers have not had a full range of choice. For example, par-
ticipants in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 7
who get no tax subsidy for additional coverage, have often had to
buy first-dollar coverage in order to get the adequate catastrophic
protection that is available only in "high-option" plans. (Moreover,
before relying too heavily on FEHBP experience, one should ask
whether federal employees as a class are typical of the population
at large or are apt to be atypically risk-averse).
In any event, the question of how consumers will behave in
the absence of the tax subsidy is not particularly relevant to the
policy question. People should be allowed to buy what they are
willing to pay for, and we should not second-guess their spending
decisions unless they are spending our money or unless their deci-
sions have material spillover effects-as a decision to forgo cata-
strophic coverage may have. In a competitive market with rede-
signed tax subsidies, people should have the opportunity to
economize, but whether they do so or not is up to them. Those who
purchase wisely may be better off than those who do not, but that
is simply their reward for making the effort to inform themselves
and to search out alternatives. Even though the usual argument is
that the tax subsidy causes an inefficient allocation of resources,
that the tax law provides a discount (before administrative expenses) of roughly 35% for all
health services purchased through an insurance plan. Feldstein & Friedman, Tax Subsidies,
the Rational Demand for Insurance and the Health Care Crisis, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 155, 156
(1977). Moreover, since effective marginal tax rates have been increasing as inflation pushes
taxpayers into higher income tax brackets and Congress legislates increases in the FICA tax
rate and wage base, the value of the tax exclusion for employer-paid premiums has been
increasing. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the exclusion will reduce federal
revenues by $21.4 billion in fiscal year 1982 and by $41.4 billion in fiscal year 1986. CoN-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFiCz, REDucmnG THE FEDERAL BUDGET. STmRATEGIS AND EXAMPLES,
FIscAL YEARS 1982-1986 130-31 (1981).
The tax subsidy for employer-paid health benefits distorts demand for insurance and
medical care in two ways. First, it induces the purchase of more comprehensive insurance
than would otherwise be purchased, which in turn extends third-party payment's distorting
effect on the demand for medical care. Second, it causes consumers to undervalue insurer
cost-containment efforts, since any saving in premium that results from such efforts and is
paid out as increased wages becomes taxable income. That means a dollar saved is not nec-
essarily a dollar earned, and as result a consumer is less likely to accept the added monetary
or nonmonetary costs of, say, strict insurer fee limits or more restricted choice of providers.
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
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perhaps a better argument for a tax change, particularly given sec-
ond-best qualifications, is simply that it would provide a strong
new incentive for innovation by insurers, providers, and others.
If Congress sees fit to continue the current tax subsidy, it can
still be argued that competition is the best allocative mechanism.
While clearly the equilibrium point the market seeks is substan-
tially influenced by the tax subsidy, it would be unwise to try to
offset the subsidy by regulation. If the subsidy is to be accepted
despite its defects, the market could still function if attention were
paid to the other obstacles that have inhibited competition in the
past.
2. Increase antitrust enforcement efforts.
The courts have now begun to grapple with the problems of
applying antitrust principles to the professions and to a market in
which insurance is a major factor. The courts have so far been un-
comfortable with the fact that the health care market does not
closely resemble the competitive model of two-party commercial
transactions on which the basic principles of antitrust law were
founded.48 Nevertheless, progress is being made, and in due course
the usual rules applicable to concerted action by competitors will
be applied to deter at least the most destructive types of explicit
restraints.49 Often, however, anticompetitive parallel conduct will
not require explicit communication between providers, with the re-
sult that antitrust enforcers may sometimes find it difficult to
prove a conspiracy when one in fact exists.8 0 Nevertheless, many of
the changes that are occurring-elimination of provider control of
financing plans like Blue Shield, for example 5 1 -will force pro-
viders to conspire in more overt and thus more detectable ways if
48. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 1980-1 Trade Cas. 63,239
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (Mar. 10, 1981).
49. See, e.g., Pollard, Fostering Competition in Health Care, in REGULATING HEALTH
CARE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 158 (A. Levin ed. 1980).
50. Through the use of code words and signals, physician organizations can invite an
outpouring of sentiment calculated to discipline an innovator. For example, a professional
group might pass a resolution that "there ought to be a law" against an insurer's making the
plan's prior authorization a prerequisite for payment for elective surgery. Such a resolution
could in turn induce individual physicians to refuse to deal with the insurer based on the
expectation that others will do likewise. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation
in Health Care Financing, supra note 2, at 345-49.
51. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., No. C-2-75-
473 (S.D. Ohio, settled March 22, 1979) (on file with the author). The Federal Trade Com-
mission may initiate a proceeding to consider a rule prohibiting physician control of financ-
ing plans. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 27.
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they are to continue to avoid competition.
Although antitrust law has sometimes been used to destroy
competition in other industries and can be disastrously regulatory,
its dominant objective is to maintain independent pricing and to
enable private entrepreneurs to take independent actions that con-
tribute to consumer welfare. Fortunately, antitrust enforcers oper-
ating in the health care industry are invoking only those laws that
govern collaboration among competitors. These rules inhibit only
collective action and thus do not restrain the individual firm. They
are an essential feature of any market in which competition rather
than regulation is relied upon to control the behavior of individual
firms and practitioners.
3. Require "multiple choice" of health plans in the employment
setting.
Several of the market reform bills pending in Congress would
require substantial employers to offer a choice of several health
plans to their employees and to make the same contribution irre-
spective of which plan is chosen.52 The idea, which is to foster con-
sumer choice by taking the final decision away from the employer
or union, seems to be a good one. Employers and unions are to
some extent trapped by their own past rhetoric, which has inflated
their health plans' symbolic value. Because health plans are a focal
point of their political relationship with the rank-and-file, a situa-
tion exists in which any economizing move seems a betrayal of an
obligation already assumed. Multiple-choice, however, might help,
since, as long as the high-cost plan is available as a fulfillment of
the acknowledged obligation, employers and unions should not be
reluctant to offer lower-cost alternatives that would benefit the
employee. Indeed, employees should regard the new opportunity to
economize as an added benefit; the increase in take-home pay re-
sulting from an economizing choice would be a palpable benefit in
precisely the way that a distribution of savings from a general cut-
back in health benefits would not be. Of course, paternalistic con-
siderations might continue to dominate the choice of plans in some
instances and might cause some unions to reject certain options,
particularly those that seem too commercial or that provide less
than comprehensive coverage. While such attitudes could be over-
come by dictating that at least one noncomprehensive option be
52. E.g., S. 433, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. 1096 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1981); S.
139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 179 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1981).
19811 1149
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
offered, I am not persuaded that this is necessary or desirable. In-
deed, I am inclined to think that it is not necessary to mandate
multiple choice at all because it is ultimately in an employer's in-
terest to adopt it voluntarily.
Some would argue that multiple-choice proposals ignore the
reality that insurers compete primarily by selecting and avoiding
risks and that rational consumer purchasing may result in adverse
selection. 53 These problems, however, can be readily overcome. The
problem is essentially the employer's since he will be under pres-
sure to increase his contribution for everyone if, through adverse
selection, one high-risk group is left inadequately covered. Unless
some badly drawn regulatory requirement for equal contributions
interferes, an employer could present the choices to his employees
in such a way that the price tags do not reflect cost differences
based on actual enrollments. Thus, insurers could quote rates for a
cross-section of employees and the pool of premiums could then be
allocated to the various plans on the basis of actuarial adjustments
reflecting the actual populations covered. Employers could also
regulate gaming by letting high-option plans impose waiting peri-
ods for some benefits. Ultimately, an employer would probably
find it desirable to cash out the incremental benefits by increasing
each employee's pay by the actuarially determined value of that
coverage and then letting him decide whether to buy it.
4. Develop voucher systems to facilitate consumer choice in
public programs.
If beneficiaries of public programs could be given the opportu-
nity to enroll in private health plans at public expense, a vast new
population would suddenly become the object of competition. Pro-
posals currently being considered" would allow Medicare benefi-
ciaries to enroll in HMOs. Although these proposals would be a
step in the right direction, they are probably too narrowly con-
ceived since they unduly limit the beneficiaries' options. There is
no good reason why beneficiaries should not be free to join health
53. "Adverse selection" occurs when individual consumers base their choice of health
plan on their anticipated medical expenses so that a disproportionate share of the high risk
consumers enroll in plans offering comprehensive coverage and a disproportionate share of
the low risk consumers enroll in plans with less complete coverage. The effect of such ad-
verse selection is to reduce the extent to which plans spread risk and thus to increase the
disparity in cost between the comprehensive plans and the less comprehensive plans.
54. E.g., H.R. 2508, 97th Cong., 1st Seass., 127 CONG. Rac. 941 (daily ed. March 12,
1981).
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plans other than HMOs as long as a reasonable benefit package is
offered. Because coverage would be offered to individuals rather
than groups, some regulation of benefit packages would probably
be necessary to prevent serious gaps, but one would hope that gov-
ernment would tolerate substantial experimentation in the design
of coverage.
Under a voucher-type system, competition for the patronage
of federal beneficiaries would focus on the scope of benefits offered
to individuals in return for the federal contribution. Plans could,
for example, offer the basic Medicare benefit package with reduced
cost sharing or with additional benefits for which a supplemental
premium might or might not be charged; state Medicaid programs
could be administered in comparable ways but without substantial
supplemental premiums, at least for the lowest income groups. The
resulting interplan competition would reinforce concerns about
cost-effectiveness and would encourage providers to develop or
participate in competitive plans and to accept their cost controls.
In due course, Medicare and Medicaid might be converted from
open-ended entitlement programs to a more controllable commit-
ment of a fixed number of dollars per beneficiary.
As attractive as voucher systems would seem to be, substantial
implementation problems are presented. Although some regulatory
oversight is clearly needed,55 government administrators, fearful of
charges that they were steering public beneficiaries toward sub-
standard care, might be inclined to overregulate the participating
plans. The effect would be to narrow the range of choice and re-
duce the chances for cost containment. A further problem lies in
calculating the appropriate public contribution-particularly for
Medicare beneficiaries, whose health status is apt to vary widely
without strict regard to age or other objective factors. Whatever
premium was paid, a substantial uninsurable population would ex-
ist and remain dependent on federal financing. Adverse selection
would also exist between plans because enrollment would be on an
individual basis and health status could not be readily captured in
55. In the early 1970s, California began encouraging enrollment of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in prepaid health plans. The effort was marred by the participation of plans that
provided inadequate medical services to their Medicaid enrollees. Despite indications that
the program was poorly managed by the state, critics of a voucher system often cite Califor-
nia's experience as evidence of fundamental flaws in the voucher concept. The experience of
Project Health in Multnomah County, Oregon, suggests, however, that a voucher system can
work if the enrollment process is more effectively policed. See D. Lawrence, Project Health:
A Case Study in Government-Sponsored Competition (May 13, 1980) (unpublished paper
on file with author).
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actuarial adjustments. Despite these obstacles, the attractiveness
of this approach would warrant its adoption even if the fine points
could not be perfectly worked out. No other satisfactory method of
introducing meaningful cost-containment incentives and the bene-
fits of competition into public programs has been identified.
B. Implementation
The transition from a market in which monopoly and regula-
tion have the upper hand to one in which competition operates as
the primary mechanism of social control will not be easy. A num-
ber of obstacles must be overcome before the market approach can
be fully and effectively implemented. This part of the Article ex-
amines some strategic elements of market implementation.
1. Rethink the role of planners and regulators.
The 1979 health planning amendments56 require regulators to
withhold regulation wherever the market appears to operate rea-
sonably well. This new mandate, assuming that it is accepted in
the right spirit, will allow regulation to adapt to changing market
circumstances at the right pace. The new law also encourages
health planners to strengthen competition, focusing particularly on
competition-oriented changes in the financing system. This legisla-
tion seems to require the health care system's planners and regula-
tors to reconceive their role. Instead of prescribing how the system
will function, they are now seen as presiding over a shift to greater
reliance on competitive forces. While this changed perception is
more easily articulated than implemented, this conceptualization
of the regulators' role does leave the market open to possibilities
for experimentation and change. Above all, the regulators must
cease to act on the unexamined premise that the market cannot
function and that cost containment is a public and not a private
responsibility. On the contrary, planners must become actively
concerned with how to make the market function better and with
promoting meaningful private sector change in their communities.
56. Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 103, 93 Stat. 594 (1979) (amending scattered sections of Title
XV of the Public Health Service Act). The procompetitive provisions of § 103 are discussed
in detail in Havighurst, Health Planning for Deregulation: Implementing the 1979 Amend-
ments, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 33 (1981). See also Havighurst & Hackbarth, Competi-
tion and Health Care: Planning for Deregulation, REGULATION, May/June 1980, at 39.
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2. Minimize cooperation among providers.
Public policy must begin to look skeptically at industry-wide
efforts to contain costs. Professionally sponsored reforms must be
subjected to close scrutiny under the antitrust laws even if they
seem to promise real cost reductions. It is not always correct that a
bird in hand is preferable to those in the bush. Accepting competi-
tor cooperation as a primary vehicle of reform threatens to perpet-
uate all of the anticompetitive assumptions of the past and to lock
providers into combinations that will necessarily inhibit competi-
tive developments. The antitrust laws do not permit anticompeti-
tive collective action to be justified on the basis that competition
would be undesirable or would not work well. Instead, the law em-
bodies the conclusive presumption that competition is always pref-
erable unless Congress has declared otherwise. Even though this
presumption may sometimes be invalid, case-by-case analysis of
the justifications for anticompetitive collaboration would be costly
and the effort would be ultimately self-defeating. In addition, the
necessary judgment is essentially legislative, and Congress so far
has not seen fit to create an exemption.
While stating that the law is clear does not establish the wis-
dom of rejecting anticompetitive collaboration, antitrust authori-
ties need not apologize for enforcing the law and for insisting that
the long-run benefits of competition be weighted more heavily
than short-run expediency. Besides perpetuating the assumption
that cooperation is preferable to competition, successful collective
action would reduce the incentives for individual initiatives. In-
deed, they are probably so intended. Thus, the medical profession
frequently has formed IPAs and other collectively controlled plans
to head off independent developments, particularly closed-panel
HMOs.5 7 Moreover, many of the profession's peer-review and cost-
57. For example, the San Joaquin County Foundation for Medical Care was organized
by the local medical society to head off inroads into that market by the Kaiser HMO.
Egdahl, Foundations for Medical Care, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 491 (1973). In effect, such a
foundation provides peer review of fees and utilization for independent insurers as a way of
coordinating the competitive response of fee-for-service physicians. Although such an effort
involving only a relatively small percentage of the market's physicians would be legal, larger
foundations sponsored by the local medical society and encompassing nearly all of the mar-
ket's physicians pose an anticompetitive threat. Independent health plans, such as Kaiser-
model HMOs, may be harmed by a profession-sponsored foundation (or IPA-type HMO)
because the profession-sponsored "reform" may reinforce the profession's sense of solidarity
in resisting change and thereby lead individual physicians to refuif to participate in the new
competitive plan, to grant its doctors hospital privileges, or to accept referrals from the new
plan. The profession-sponsored organization may also engage in limit-entry pricing to deter
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control efforts are designed to preempt insurer initiatives. 8 Profes-
sion-controlled financing plans and peer-review efforts should be
regarded as violations of the antitrust laws in order to stimulate
the private sector to approach these problems competitively. This
conclusion seems fully warranted as a matter of both antitrust law
and sound policy.
3. Give up the notion that a minimum benefit package should
be prescribed by federal law.
A common assumption is that government has an obligation to
guarantee some minimum level of financial protection against
health care costs and that this obligation can be met only by pre-
scribing a minimum benefit package for private insurance. For ex-
ample, competition advocate Alain Enthoven has consistently
stressed comprehensive coverage as a fundamental requirement of
his innovative Consumer-Choice Health Plan.5 ' His plan would not
allow for coverage exclusions that could facilitate cost contain-
ment. While such exclusions are somewhat problematical, I see no
good reason to prescribe a minimum benefit package for all con-
sumers, thus impairing insurers' cost-containment capabilities by
restricting them to HMO-type strategies and traditional cost-shar-
ing techniques.10 Because Enthoven contemplates that insurance
would no longer be purchased through employment groups, he
feels the need to insure that there are no unconscionable gaps in
coverage. The employment setting, however, provides a valuable
screening mechanism that will prevent inappropriate coverage
gaps. Thus, keeping insurance in the workplace makes it possible
to leave a full range of strategies available. As noted earlier,!1 plans
that enroll public beneficiaries may require benefit-package regula-
threatened entry, or in predatory pricing to eliminate or discipline any entrant that might
appear. For a more detailed discussion of why profession-sponsored "reforms" such as IPAs
and foundations for medical care pose an anticompetitive threat, see Havighurst & Hack-
barth, supra note 40. But see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 1980-1 Trade
Cas. 1 63,239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (March 10, 1981) (holding that
maximum-fee setting by a foundation for medical care representing 80% of a market's phy-
sicians is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws).
58. For more on this thesis, see Havighurst & Kissam, The Antitrust Implications of
Relative Value Studies in Medicine, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48, 58-61 (1979).
59. See Enthoven, supra note 14.
60. Consider, for example, the desirability of the following types of exclusion: an ex-
pensive and highly debatable new surgical procedure; hospital days beyond "x" days after a
particular surgical procedure; hospitalization connected with procedures that could be done
on an outpatient basis.
61. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
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tion, since public beneficiaries will purchase as individuals and not
in groups.
4. Avoid community-rating requirements.
Another significant difference existing between Enthoven and
myself has to do with his proposal that all plans engage in commu-
nity rating. I would regard such a regulatory requirement as a pro-
hibition of normal cost-based pricing-and of price competi-
tion-and as an invitation to collusion. Moreover, no need exists
for it if group purchasing continues and if adverse selection
problems raised by multiple-choice offerings can be solved within
employment groups. Although Enthoven's plan contemplates a
good deal of regulation and would curtail and channel competition
more than I think necessary, he has actively supported both a tax
change and the multiple-choice concept and would, I think, be
quite comfortable with the competition that those proposals would
bring about.62
5. Suppress the urge to pursue a comprehensive legislative
program.
Aside from tightly limiting the tax subsidy and mandating
multiple choice for public and possibly for private health plan ben-
eficiaries, little immediate need exists for legislative change. In my
view-which is more laissez-faire and less legislation-oriented than
that of some market advocates-the greatest contribution that
government could make at the present time would be to declare
that, except in the government's own programs, cost containment
is a private, not a public, responsibility-to be carried out in a
competitive environment with neither assistance nor interference
from government. One reason that the private sector has developed
so few cost-containment tools is that it has anticipated that the
government would take some kind of definitive action to control
costs. Although this action was never taken, the prospect of it kept
the private sector virtually transfixed for a decade, since it ap-
peared that any private effort, other than HMO development,
might quickly be rendered obsolete. With government looming as
so large and unpredictable a factor, the industry's best minds were
absorbed in trying to understand its behavior, in adjusting to its
latest actions, in anticipating and influencing its next moves, and
62. See Enthoven, The Competition Strategy: Status & Prospects, 304 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 109 (1981).
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in generally trying to satisfy public officials rather than consumers.
It would be most unfortunate if competition and private cost con-
tainment continue to be perceived as activities that require a legis-
lative signal to begin. While the Enthoven proposal"3 and the
Gephardt-Stockman bille are interesting and important, competi-
tion focusing on cost containment requires little new legislation,
and it would be a constructive step for government so to declare.
6. Undertake a thorough policy review of the myriad regulatory
and other policies that inhibit competition in this industry
with a view to making them consistent with a
market-oriented regime.
It has been argued that there are too many regulatory pro-
grams in place, too many barriers to the creation of the open mar-
ket, and too many contrary assumptions already built into public
policy to permit the kinds of changes necessary to implement the
market strategy. Several considerations, however, persuade me
that a thoroughgoing policy overhaul is possible. First, the anti-
trust laws are already in place and are being applied to the indus-
try with some skill and insight. Second, the Reagan Administration
and Congress seem prepared to reexamine the premises on which
public policy has been based in the past."5 Third, the nation as a
whole is willing to reexamine questions concerning the role of gov-
ernment in general, and we may be on the brink of a period in
which it will be possible to reduce government involvement in ar-
eas in which it is not clearly needed. Last, market forces are begin-
ning to take over even without government's explicit permission."
63. See Enthoven, supra note 14.
64. H.R. 850, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 116 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981).
65. Sponsors of procompetitive health bills occupy key positions in the Reagan Ad-
ministration and the 97th Congress: the Secretary of Health and Human Services, former
Senator Richard Schweiker, was the sponsor of S. 1590 in the 96th Congress, S. 1590, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 10664 (daily ed. July 26, 1979); before he was confirmed as
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, former Congressman David Stockman
was a cosponsor of H.R. 850, 97th Congress, H.R. 850, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc.
116 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981); Representative James Jones (sponsor of H.R. 7528, 96th Con-
gress, H.R. 7528, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 4686 (daily ed. June 9, 1980)) is
Chairman of the House Budget Committee; Senator Orrin Hatch (sponsor of S. 139, 97th
Congress, S. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 136 (Jan. 15, 1981)) is Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources; and Senator David Durenberger
(sponsor of S. 433, 97th Congress, S. 433, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 1096 (daily
ed. Feb. 5, 1981)) is Chairman of the Health Subcommittee of the Senate Finance
Committee.
66. The most often cited example of a workably competitive market is the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul area. Christianson & McClure, Competition in the Delivery of Medical Care,
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It is possible that we will eventually be faced with a virtual fait
accompli demonstration that government has only to stand aside
to allow the market to finish the job. Given these forces, predic-
tions are unreliable. Even though programs and assumptions may
have been immune to criticism in the recent past, I see reasons to
think that all the old bets are off and that the basic foundations of
policy can indeed be reexamined and changed. While a major re-
education and reform effort is needed, I believe the time has come
to scrutinize and revise established precepts and programs in such
areas as health manpower, insurance regulation, professional self-
regulation, malpractice law, and quality assurance.
V. CONCLUSION
Arguments against the market reform strategy frequently be-
gin with charges that it represents a naive application of the mod-
els of Economics 101 to a uniquely complex industry. Market op-
ponents then usually proceed to cite the textbook conditions for
perfect competition-e.g., the need for perfect information-to
show how the market cannot work. What such arguments reveal,
however, is that it is the market opponent himself who is basing
arguments on simplistic economics. Moreover, such critics of the
market strategy usually fail to employ the same skepticism in in-
voking the textbook model of their preferred strategy, whether it
be government regulation on the one hand or industry or profes-
sional self-regulation on the other. In fact, the competitive strat-
egy, in addition to being supported by a powerful theory that is
not undercut by the existence of any insurmountable market fail-
ure, comes out very well in any realistic comparison with alterna-
tive mechanisms for controlling the health care industry's eco-
nomic performance.
The empirical evidence supporting the competitive strategy,
while still highly anecdotal, is increasingly compelling. Although
we have yet to see a truly untrammeled market or any long-term
results, the industry has demonstrated a potential for competi-
tively stimulated innovation. Moreover, persuasive and well-docu-
301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 812 (1979). The Hawaii and Portland, Oregon, markets are also rea-
sonably competitive. A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 82-89 (1980). Still other markets hold con-
siderable competitive promise. Aquilina & McClure, The Potential for a Competitive
Health Care System in Boston, Massachusetts (InterStudy, 1980); Christianson, The Po-
tential for a Competitive Health Care System in Denver, Colorado (InterStudy, 1979); En-
thoven, supra note 62 (dealing with the potential for a competitive market in northern
California).
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mented explanations exist for the industry's past failure to solve
the cost problem. In sum, it is extremely difficult to dispute that, if
care is taken about the details, the market reform strategy of re-
moving demand distortions and restraints on innovation would do
just what it sets out to do-that is, facilitate the efficient allocation
of private resources in the provision of health services.
If market efficacy were the only consideration, controversy
over the desirability of competition would hardly exist. The only
problem would be political resistance from those who stand to lose
power, perquisites, and profits in a competitive world. Unfortu-
nately, however, national health policy must be concerned with
more than how consumers can get value for their money in
purchasing health services. If we are not careful, the victims of
competition may include not only those who lose monopoly power
but also some innocent citizens whose losses, and some activities
whose loss, we are not prepared to tolerate. If competition's ero-
sion of hidden internal subsidies is coupled with an unwillingness
or inability of government to supply new explicit ones, competition
could do real, though inadvertent, harm both to the cause of social
justice and to medical education and research. While social policy
probably should not tolerate a huge sacrifice of efficiency to fore-
stall such problems, I believe that the policy agenda should give
equal priority to compensating for these potential losses by assur-
ing the equitable distribution of the dividends of competition. Po-
litical leaders and market advocates now have a duty to address
the danger that competition-induced stringencies may widen the
cracks into which some citizens and some useful activities can fall.
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